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AMOUNT-IN-CONTROVERSY IN THE TENTH
CIRCUIT: PROVIDING A CORPORATE
DEFENDANT EVEN MORE POWER UNDER CAFA
Isaac Leon*

INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution provides the starting point for diversity
jurisdiction in the federal courts.1 Pursuant to this constitutional authority, the first
Congress granted federal courts jurisdiction over diversity cases in the Judiciary Act
of 1789.2 Congress conditioned that jurisdiction with an amount-in-controversy
threshold. 3 Since the Judiciary Act of 1789, the amount-in-controversy threshold has
increased from $2,000 in 1887,4 to $3,000 in 1911,5 $10,000 in 1958,6 $50,000 in
1988,7 and $75,000 in 1996,8 at which it remains to this day. This threshold is further
limited by Supreme Court precedent requiring complete diversity between all
plaintiffs and all defendants to gain access to a federal forum.9
Prior to the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), the diversity
jurisdiction statute was the main vehicle used by defendants to attempt to remove

* University of New Mexico School of Law, Class of 2019. I would like to thank my brothers,
Andrew and Adrian Leon, for always being my side; my parents, Victor and Cynthia Leon, for always
pushing me to the best of my abilities; and my grandparents, Chris and Sam Lucero and Reyes and Katy
Leon, for building the foundation that allows our family to grow every day.
1. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
2. The Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 § 11.1 Stat. 79. First Congress. Sess. I. Ch. 20. Sec. 11 (1789)
(establishing the first amount-in-controversy threshold in diversity cases to be $500).
3. See Evan A. Creutz, Two Sides to Every Story: Measuring the Jurisdictional Amount in Federal
Courts, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1719, at 1723 (2000) (stating that “[t]he original Congressional intent
behind the amount-in-controversy requirement is not entirely clear from legislative history. Some scholars
argue that the original purpose of the requirement was to protect defendants from having to travel long
distances to defend relatively small claims. Today, that reasoning is less applicable in light of the
increasing feasibility of interstate travel. A more modern justification for the jurisdictional amount, as
evidenced by the number of successive increases in the amount by Congress, is to reduce the caseload in
an already congested federal court system”) (internal citations omitted); see also supra note 2 and
accompanying text.
4. Act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 552.
5. Act of March 3, 1911, 36 Stat. 1091.
6. Act of July 25, 1958, 72 Stat. 415
7. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, 102 Stat. 4646.
8. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 3850.
9. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806); See also Lincoln Property Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S.
81 (2005) (stating, “[W]e have read the statutory formulation ‘between . . . citizens of different States’ to
require complete diversity between all plaintiffs and all defendants.”).
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class action lawsuits under state law to federal court.10 CAFA altered, among other
traditional diversity requirements,11 the amount-in-controversy threshold to
$5,000,000 specifically for class action lawsuits.12 This new amount-in-controversy
threshold has been contentious among litigants in its relatively short lifetime.13 In
Hammond v. Stamps.com,14 a jurisdictional dispute arose in the Tenth Circuit that
allowed a corporate defendant to provide minimal data about who a putative class
may eventually include. The Tenth Circuit interpreted CAFA to allow Stamps.com
to over-inflate the potential amount-in-controversy,15 which gave corporate
defendants even more power under legislation already criticized as a corporate power
grab.16
Part I explores the general legislative history of CAFA and provides an
overview of the arguments that supporters and critics have concerning the Act. Then
it explains CAFA’s general provisions and how the Supreme Court decided the
evidentiary standard to apply when a defendant files a notice of removal.
Part II discusses how Hammond v. Stamps.com handled an amount-incontroversy dispute between a putative class and a corporate defendant in the Tenth
Circuit. This section explores the factual background of the case, the reasoning of
both the District Court and Tenth Circuit Court, and how the Tenth Circuit overruled
the District Court’s holding.
Part III critiques the Tenth Circuit’s application of CAFA amount-incontroversy precedent. Under the minimal evidence provided, the Tenth Circuit
should have affirmed the ruling below as correctly applying the Supreme Court’s
guidance on this type of amount-in-controversy dispute. This section then provides
additional judicial policy reasons supporting why federal subject matter jurisdiction
was not present. Acknowledging that the Tenth Circuit had minimal evidence to
work with, a possible solution to amount-in-controversy disputes at this early stage
of litigation is offered. A limited discovery approach balances the equities of the
litigants and the limited federal judicial resources while still falling within Supreme
Court precedent. This Note concludes that the limited discovery approach should

10. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a) (2011); See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546
(2005) (holding that the plaintiff class could invoke supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367
(1990) if one class member satisfied the $75,000 threshold allowing the rest of the class to tag along).
11. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2011).
12. Id. § 1332(d)(2) (2011).
13. See e.g., Frederick v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 683 F.3d 1242, 1247-48 (10th Cir. 2012)
(stating “punitive damages may be considered in determining the requisite jurisdictional amount. But this
does not mean that a defendant’s mere use of the words punitive damages automatically justifies the
removal of a case on the theory that punitive damages in some unspecified amount may be possible”);
Keeling v. Esurance Ins. Co., 660 F.3d 273 (7th Cir. 2011) (including the cost of complying with an
injunction by determining the present value of losing a certain “stream of profits”); Lowdermilk v. U.S.
Bank National Ass’n, 479 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2007) (allowing attorneys’ fees to be included in amount-incontroversy calculation when provided by statute); Blockbuster, Inc. v. Galeno, 472 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2006)
(including statutory damages in amount-in-controversy calculation).
14. 844 F.3d 909 (10th Cir. 2016).
15. See id.
16. See generally Senate Judiciary Committee Report on the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, S.
REP. No. 109-14, at 79–95 (2005).
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have been used in Hammond v. Stamps.com as creating an effective and efficient
approach that could have been used going forward in the Tenth Circuit.
PART I – BACKGROUND
I.

CAFA’s contested legislative history.

CAFA is the result of a long battle in both houses of Congress with strong
viewpoints either supporting or criticizing the new avenue for class action lawsuits
into federal court.17 A CAFA bill was first introduced in 1997,18 but on multiple
occasions was not able to pass the Senate.19 CAFA, as it stands today, was
reintroduced by the 109th Congress and approved by the appropriate House and
Senate Committees without amendment in 2005.20
CAFA’s supporters contend that the Act balances free access to federal
courts while preventing inconsistent state court rulings that often have national
implications.21 Interstate class action lawsuits usually involve many plaintiffs, large
amounts of money, and can significantly affect interstate commerce and national
policy.22 Thus, CAFA sought to remedy a perceived threat to federalism – the idea
that one state court’s decision in a nationwide class action could bind other state
courts across the country.23 CAFA has also been defended as minimizing certain
abuses that took place in state courts such as judges certifying classes too easily and
allowing plaintiffs’ attorneys to exclude class members with potential damages over
$75,000 to avoid federal court.24
However, CAFA’s critics argue that the state court abuses were overstated
and a federal trend to not certify class actions concerning multiple state laws may
result in dismissal of meritorious claims on procedural grounds.25 Nearly all state
Attorney Generals showed concern that CAFA would limit their power to protect
their state’s citizens by restricting their ability to file suit as class representatives for

17. Id. at 27.
18. Class Action Fairness Act of 1997, S. 254, 105th Cong. (1997).
19. 14A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3705.1
Aggregation of Claims – Shareholder Derivative Suits and Class Actions – Effects of the Supplemental
Jurisdiction and the Class Action Fairness Acts at 2 (Thomas Reuters 4th ed. 2017).
20. Id.
21. See S. REP. NO. 109-14 (2005). See also Preston v. Tenet Healthsystem Memorial Medical
Center, Inc., 485 F.3d 793 (5th Cir. 2007) (stating CAFA’s purpose as to encourage federal jurisdiction
over interstate class actions of national interest); Genton v. Vestin Realty Mortg. II, Inc., 2007 WL 951838
(S.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2007) (stating a strong preference that interstate class actions be heard in federal court
if removed by defendant).
22. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 27 (2005).
23. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 19, § 3705 at 3.
24. Id.; see also Lowery v. Alabama Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1193 (11th Cir. 2007) (stating
“Congress enacted CAFA to address inequitable state court treatment of class actions and to put an end to
certain abusive practices by plaintiffs’ counsel); Thompson v. Jiffy Lube Intern., Inc., 505 F. Supp. 2d
907 (D. Kan. 2007) (stating “CAFA . . . address[ed] the fact that ‘pre-CAFA class action laws led to
abuses, including: class members received little or no benefit; state courts kept cases of national
importance out of Federal Court; state courts demonstrated bias against out-of-state defendants; and state
courts made judgments imposing their view of the law on other states”); S REP. NO. 109-14, at 37 (2005).
25. See “Additional Views of Senator Patrick Leahy,” S. REP. NO. 109-14 (2005).
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their state’s consumers.26 Further, certifying a class action is more difficult and time
consuming in federal court leaving the injured class in limbo and inevitably
increasing the cost of litigation.27
II. CAFA’s provisions.
CAFA gives federal district courts subject matter jurisdiction over class
action lawsuits where the amount-in-controversy exceeds $5,000,000, exclusive of
interest and costs, and there is minimal diversity among the proposed class members
and defendants.28 CAFA also gives federal district courts discretion to decline to
exercise jurisdiction when considering certain factors29 and lists specific instances
when federal district courts must decline jurisdiction.30 The provisions allowing
district courts to decline jurisdiction do not apply if the primary defendant is a State
government, or the proposed class is less than one hundred members.31 The claims
of the class members must be aggregated to determine if the amount-in-controversy
threshold is met.32 The class members’ citizenship is determined at the date the
complaint is filed.33 If an initial complaint was not subject to federal jurisdiction,
then citizenship is determined at the date an amended complaint is filed.34 These
provisions apply before or after a class has been certified by a court.35
CAFA also does not apply to claims under section 16(f)(3) of the Securities
Act of 1933 and section 28(f)(5)(E) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, claims
relating to internal affairs or governance of an organization, or claims relating to the
rights, duties, and obligations relating to any security.36 Whether an entity is
incorporated or not, state citizenship is determined by either its principal place of

26. See id.
27. See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 85, 88 (2005).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2011).
29. Id. § 1332(d)(3). A district court may decline to exercise jurisdiction if greater than one third or
less than two-thirds of the members of the proposed class are citizens of the State where the action was
originally filed, while considering such factors as the claim is of national or interstate interest, whether
the governing laws are of the State where the claim was filed or another State, whether the claim is plead
in a way trying to avoid Federal jurisdiction, the State citizenship of members of the proposed class, and
if one or more class actions alleging a similar claim has been filed.
30. Id. § 1332(d)(4). A district court must decline jurisdiction if greater than two-thirds of the
proposed class are citizens of the State the claim was filed; at least one of the defendants the class is
seeking significant relief from, this defendant’s alleged conduct is a significant basis of this claim, and
this defendant is a citizen of the State the claim was filed; and the alleged harm occurred in the State the
claim was filed, and no other claim alleging the same harm has been filed or two-thirds of more of the
proposed class and the primary defendant are citizens of the State the claim was brought.
31. Id. § 1332(d)(5).
32. Id. § 1332(d)(6).
33. Id. § 1332(d)(7).
34. Id.
35. Id. § 1332(d)(8).
36. Id. § 1332(d)(9).
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business or the State under whose laws it is organized.37 Mass action lawsuits are
also governed by CAFA if certain other provisions are met.38
Removal of a class action is the same as any civil action with the exception
that any defendant may remove without the consent of all defendants.39 The
procedure after removal has been granted is the same as any civil action except that
a remand back to state court is appealable.40 The same exceptions to CAFA relating
to securities and internal governance of an organization do not apply to this removal
section.41 CAFA also provides its own definitions section,42 governance of coupon
settlements, 43 discretion in approving settlements that result in a net loss to the class
because of an obligation to pay class counsel,44 discretion in approving settlements
that favor class members in one geographic location,45 and the notification to the
proper federal and state officials when a settlement is reached.46
III. CAFA’s application – Determining the amount-in-controversy.
Circuit courts throughout the nation consistently held that CAFA left intact
the general rule that defendants, as the party seeking removal to federal court, have
the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction.47 However, the circuit courts were
split on whether a defendant’s notice of removal must contain evidence that the
amount-in-controversy threshold is satisfied.48
37. Id. § 1332(d)(10); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 19, § 3705 at 4 (“The methods by which federal
courts are to determine the citizenship of persons and corporations for the purpose of diversity jurisdiction
are unchanged by the new law. However, subsection (d)(10) of the amended Section 1332 provides that
for purposes of original and removal jurisdiction in class and mass actions, the citizenship of an
unincorporated association shall be determined as if the unincorporated association were a corporation.
Consequently, an unincorporated association will be deemed to be a citizen of the state where it has its
principal place of business and the state under whose laws it is organized.”).
38. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(11).
39. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b) (2011) (allowing removal without consent of all defendants in
class actions) with 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A) (2011) (requiring consent of all defendants for removal in
civil actions).
40. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1) (2011) (granting appellate review of remand orders for class
actions) with 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2011) (denying appellate review of remand orders for civil actions).
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(d) (2011).
42. Id. § 1711.
43. Id. § 1712.
44. Id. § 1713.
45. Id. § 1714.
46. Id. § 1715.
47. See Appert v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Inc. 673 F.3d 609, 618 (7th Cir. 2012) (stating “the
removing party bears the burden of establishing the general requirements of CAFA jurisdiction”); see also
Westerfeld v. Independent Processing, LLC, 621 F.3d 819, 822 (8th Cir. 2010) (stating “[a]lthough CAFA
expanded federal jurisdiction over class actions, it did not alter the general rule that the party seeking to
remove a case to federal court bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction”); but see S. REP. NO.
109-14, at 43 (2005) (stating “it is the intent of the Committee that the named plaintiff(s) should bear the
burden of demonstrating that a case should be remanded to state court”).
48. See Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 251 F.3d 2001 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that the amountin-controversy must be established by a preponderance of the evidence and the complaint, on its face, did
not satisfy this requirement.); But see Spivey v. Vertrue, Inc., 528 F.3d 982 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that
“[removal] is a pleading requirement, not a demand for proof.”), Hartis v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 694 F.3d
935 (8th Cir. 2012) (stating that the notice of removal imposed only a pleading requirement).
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In Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens,49 the Supreme Court
provided lower courts guidance on the standard of proof a removing defendant must
meet to satisfy CAFA’s amount-in-controversy requirement. The Court held that a
notice of removal need only contain a plausible allegation that the amount-incontroversy threshold is met.50 Evidence establishing this amount is required if the
plaintiff contests this allegation or the court inquires further.51 Both sides submit
proof and a preponderance of the evidence standard applies.52
PART II – CAFA IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT
I.

Hammond v. Stamps.com – The District Court53

A denial of a remand order arose in the Tenth Circuit in Hammond v.
Stamps.com concerning the $5,000,000 amount-in-controversy threshold.54 The
district court correctly applied Dart Cherokee’s holding and should have been
affirmed.55 The Tenth Circuit has allowed a corporate defendant to withhold data
about whom the putative class may eventually include allowing it to inflate the
amount-in-controversy at this early stage of litigation.
Hammond filed her complaint for conversion, unjust enrichment, unfair
practices and class action on June 8, 2015 against Stamps.com in New Mexico’s First
Judicial District Court.56 In her complaint she includes various factual allegations of
her desire to purchase stamps online, and her encounter with a not-so-user-friendly
website.57 After entering her financial information and creating an account,58
Hammond decided not to purchase any goods or services from the website.59 After
viewing her next two monthly bank statements, she noticed two separate charges of
$15.99.60 She contacted a customer service representative explaining how she felt
deceived by the website and cancelled her subscription.61
Hammond sought to represent a class of “hundreds or thousands of persons
residing throughout New Mexico and America”62 who had to also call Stamps.com
to cancel their account after realizing they were still being charged money.63 The
49. 135 S. Ct. 547 (2014).
50. Id. at 553 (establishing that a notice of removal need only contain a “short and plain statement of
the grounds for removal . . . [b]y design, § 1446(a) tracks the general pleading requirements stated in Rule
8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”); see 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (2011); FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).
51. Dart Cherokee 135 S. Ct. 547, 554.
52. Id.
53. A separate issue arose regarding whether or not Hammond and others similarly situated must
pursue their claim through arbitration and whether an arbitration clause was enforceable. This issue is
outside the scope of this paper.
54. 844 F.3d 909 (10th Cir. 2016).
55. Hammond v. Stamps.com, 2016 WL 8905293 (D.N.M. Dec. 20, 2016).
56. Complaint, Hammond v. Stamps.com, (D-101-CV-2015-01393).
57. See id. at ¶¶ 9, 11-18.
58. See id. at ¶ 19.
59. See id. at ¶¶ 20, 21.
60. See id. at ¶¶ 22, 23.
61. See id. at ¶¶26, 27.
62. Id. at ¶ 45.
63. Id. at ¶ 41.
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complaint further alleges that “knowledge of the precise size of the class is within
the Defendant’s control and will be determined through discovery.”64 Hammond did
not specify a final dollar amount in her complaint.65
Stamps.com removed the case to federal court.66 Stamps.com asserted that
with respect to the Unfair Practices Act claim, the injured class would be entitled to
treble damages in the amount of three hundred dollars.67 Its records showed that in
the past year over 20,000 customers contacted the company to cancel their
subscription.68 Stamps.com argued that multiplying 20,000 by the $300 treble
damages satisfied CAFA’s $5,000,000 amount-in-controversy requirement.69
Hammond moved for an order remanding the case to state court, claiming
that Stamps.com failed to satisfy CAFA’s amount-in-controversy requirement.70
Hammond argued that her individual claim was only worth $31.98, or the value of a
two-month subscription to Stamps.com.71 Hammond claimed that she alone was
entitled to three hundred dollars in damages pursuant to the Unfair Practices Act,
while the remainder of class members were limited to only the price they paid for a
two-month subscription.72 Hammond also claimed the mere fact that 20,000
customers cancelled their subscriptions does not tell the court who would fall within
the putative class.73 The defendant retains the burden of proof, “and removal
jurisdiction cannot be based on conjecture, surmise or guesswork.”74

64. Id. at ¶ 46.
65. See generally id. at final paragraph. (The complaint asks “for entry of judgment as follows: for
compensatory, restitutionary, economic and actual damages to Plaintiff; for punitive or exemplary
damages to Plaintiff sufficient in amount to economically deter Defendant and others similarly situated
from a similar course of conduct; alternatively for $100 in damages under the New Mexico Unfair
Practices Act plus treble damages; For such other and further relief as the court deems just, proper, and
lawful; and for all pre-judgment and post judgment interest allowed by law. Plaintiff prays the court certify
a class of Plaintiffs and enter judgment for each member of the class. Plaintiff requests an award of her
attorney fees and costs.”).
66. Notice of Removal, Hammond v. Stamps.com, (D-101-CV-2015-01393).
67. Id. at ¶ 11(b).
68. Id. at ¶ 11(c).
69. Id.
70. Motion for Remand, Hammond v. Stamps.com, 2016 WL 8905293, (D.N.M. July 19, 2015) (D101-CV-2015-01393).
71. Id. at 2, 3 (arguing that “[n]o reasonable plaintiff could fairly claim Stamps converted more than
$31.98 from them or was unjustly enriched in excess of that amount. This is because after 2 months of the
charges a person should be on constructive if not actual notice of the charges.”).
72. Id. at 4. (noting that “NMSA 57-12-10(B) (2005) sets forth the private remedy provided by the
UPA for an individual named Plaintiff: ‘an action to recover actual damages or the sum of one hundred
dollars ($100), whichever is greater. Where the trier of fact finds that the party charged with an unfair or
deceptive trade practice or an unconscionable trade practice has willfully engaged in the trade practice,
the court may award up to three times actual damages or three hundred dollars ($300), whichever is
greater.’”) (emphasis already added).
73. Id. at 8. However, Hammond conceded that if approximately 20,000 customers cancelled their
service, “perhaps 10,000 would be legitimate members of the proposed class.” Id. Assuming 10,000 class
members multiplied by $31.98, and even if each member could receive $100 for the conversion claim, the
amount-in-controversy is only $1,000,000. Id.
74. Id. at 8.
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As Hammond has now contested Stamps.com’s removal to federal court,
evidence is necessary to determine the validity of the removal allegation.75
Stamps.com provided a declaration of the Corporate Controller as evidence that the
amount-in-controversy was satisfied.76 He stated that in addition to the 20,000
cancellations in the past year, more than 312,680 customers cancelled their
subscription in the four years prior to the complaint yielding more than $5,000,000
in revenue.77 Hammond remained adamant that without Stamps.com revealing how
many customers cancelled their subscription for the same reason as her, the 312,680
total cancellations can be misleading as they may not be part of the injured class.78
The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico concluded
that Stamps.com had not shown that CAFA’s jurisdictional prerequisites had been
met.79 The Court reasoned that the preponderance of the evidence standard looks to
what a fact finder might legally conclude the damages are.80 Thus, the Court first
sought to determine the amount-in-controversy per putative class member.81 The
Court concluded that Hammond lacked authority to bind the other putative members
to an amount less than what she alleged to be entitled to.82 Therefore, three hundred
dollars per putative class member was in controversy.83
Next, the Court looked to the number of members in the putative class.84
Hammond characterized the putative class as “all residents of the United States of
America who were required to telephone the Defendant to cancel their account after
discovering the Defendant was taking money from them.”85 Thus, the Court reasoned
that the putative class did not include former customers who canceled their accounts
for other reasons, such as not liking the service, no longer needing the service, or the
cost was too expensive.86 Despite Stamps.com’s Corporate Controller’s declaration
about all cancellations leading up to the complaint, the number of those who
cancelled that fit the putative class’s description is unknown.87 Stamps.com has sole

75. See Dart Cherokee, 135 S. Ct. at 554.
76. Declaration of James Treganza in Support of Defendant’s Opposition to Remand Motion at 1,
Hammond v. Stamps.com, 2016 WL 8905293, (D.N.M. Aug. 5, 2015), (D-101-CV-2015-01393).
77. Id. at 2 (Four years is the applicable statute of limitations for the Unfair Practices Act).
78. See Reply to Defendant’s Opposition to Motion for Remand, at 3, Hammond v. Stamps.com,
2016 WL 8905293, (D.N.M. Aug. 13, 2015) (D-101-CV-2015-01393).
79. Hammond, 2016 WL 8905293 at *1 (D.N.M, Sept. 23, 2016).
80. Id. (citing Hartis v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 694 F.3d 935, 944 (8th Cir. 2012)).
81. Id. at *6.
82. Id. at *6; see Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345, 1349 (2013) (reasoning that a
precertification stipulation only binds the sole representative and does not reduce the value of the putative
class members’ claims).
83. Hammond, 2016 WL 8905293 at *6.
84. Id. at *7.
85. Id. (citing Complaint at ¶ 41).
86. Id. at *7.
87. Id. at *8.

Summer 2018

AMOUNT-IN-CONTROVERSY IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT

515

access to this data.88 Stamps.com, as the party seeking removal to the federal forum,89
had the burden of proof to demonstrate the requisite amount-in-controversy. A
perfunctory affidavit by the Corporate Controller was not enough to meet that
burden.
As having the burden of proof, Stamps.com needed to present this evidence
and failed to do so.90 The evidence presented does not prove if the putative class
would contain 1,000 members or 100,000 members with each being equally
probable.91 The Court reasoned that equal probability of who the putative class
entails does not satisfy the preponderance of the evidence standard.92 Because
Stamps.com retained the burden of proof, the evidence lay within its control, and it
failed to provide the necessary evidence to support a class size showing a satisfied
amount-in-controversy, the case was remanded.93
II. Hammond v. Stamps.com – The Tenth Circuit.
The Tenth Circuit vacated the district court’s remand order.94 The Court
was not convinced by the District Court’s reasoning that without removing who
cancelled their subscription for the same reason as Hammond, the amount-incontroversy requirement was not satisfied.95 The Tenth Circuit reasoned that the
party seeking removal only needs to show that “a fact finder might legally conclude”
the damages to exceed the jurisdictional limit.96 The Court cites Supreme Court
precedent that “it must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than
the jurisdictional amount.”97 Congress did not provide any reason to not interpret the
phrase “amount-in-controversy” in a manner different than its traditional
understanding.98

88. Id. (stating “[p]resumably those representatives ask the customers why they wish to cancel so that
the representative can attempt to persuade them to maintain his or her account. It defies common sense
that a large company like Stamps.com, whose life blood appears to be monthly subscription fees, would
not keep data regarding the reasons for customer cancellations in an effort to achieve greater retention.”).
89. Supra note 47 and accompanying text.
90. Hammond, 2016 WL 8905293 at *9.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Hammond v. Stamps.com, 844 F3d 909, 914 (10th Cir. 2016).
95. Id. at 911.
96. Id. at 912 (emphasis in original).
97. Id. (citing St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938)).
98. Id. (“As historically used, the term ‘in controversy’ has never required a party seeking to invoke
federal jurisdiction to show that damages ‘are greater’ or will likely prove greater ‘than the requisite
amount’ specified by statute. Instead, the term has required a party seeking federal jurisdiction to show
only and much more modestly that a ‘fact finder might legally conclude’ that damages exceed the statutory
amount. As the Supreme Court has explained, to justify dismissal under this standard ‘it must appear to a
legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount.’ And this court has repeatedly
‘cautioned counsel and courts’ against pursing any other understanding or test. Of course, all these
expositions about the meaning of the term ‘in controversy’ have come in the course of interpreting earlier
federal jurisdictional statutes and it is at least conceivable Congress could have meant something different
in CAFA. Our presumption of consistent usage is just that, a presumption. But we cannot think of—and
the parties do not even attempt to give us—any reason to suppose that in using the term ‘in controversy’

516

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 48; No. 3

The Tenth Circuit noted that while it is unlikely all 312,680 members
cancelled their subscription for the same reason as Hammond, no one identified any
legal impediment precluding a jury from finding all 312,680 persons entitled to
relief.99 Even if it is highly improbable the plaintiffs will be awarded the amount
alleged, this does not meet the legally impossible standard.100
The Court noted that a more aggressive inquiry into the likelihood of
success will expend resources more appropriate for adjudicating the merits.101 It
dismisses the idea of waiting until the class is certified and allowing the case to
proceed in state court before deciding if removal is proper.102 The Court reasons that
allowing a mini-trial for likely success on the merits was not enacted into the statute,
while it could have been if Congress wished.103
Thus, the Tenth Circuit held that once the party seeking federal jurisdiction
gives a plausible explanation of how the amount-in-controversy exceeds $5,000,000,
the case belongs in federal court unless it is legally impossible for the plaintiff to
recover that amount.104 The remand order back to state court was vacated and federal
court was deemed the proper forum.105
PART III – ANALYSIS
I.

The Tenth Circuit applied the wrong jurisdictional analysis and the
District Court should have been upheld.

Dart Cherokee established the steps a district court must take when facing
a jurisdictional dispute such as in Hammond v. Stamps.com.106 The first prong of
Dart Cherokee’s holding was not problematic. Here, Stamps.com’s notice of
removal contained a plausible allegation that the amount-in-controversy requirement
was met, therefore satisfying the first prong of Dart Cherokee’s holding.107

Congress in CAFA meant anything at odds with our traditional understanding.”) (emphasis in original)
(internal citations omitted).
99. Id.
100. Id. (citing Raskas v. Johnson & Johnson, 719 F.3d 884,888 (8th Cir. 2013)). Prior to Dart
Cherokee, several circuits imposed the legal impossibility standard. This standard provides that once a
removing defendant explains plausibly the amount-in-controversy to be satisfied, federal jurisdiction is
proper unless it is legally impossible for the plaintiff to recover the amount. See generally, Raskas, 719
F.3d 884; Frederick v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 683 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2012); Hartis v. Chicago
Title Ins. Co., 656 F.3d 778 (8th Cir. 2009); Spivey v. Vertrue, Inc., 528 F.3d 982 (7th Cir. 2008);
Blomberg v. Service Corp., Intern., 639 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 2011); Keeling v. Esurance Ins., Co., 660 F.3d
273 (7th Cir. 2011).
101. Hammond, 844 F.3d at 913.
102. Id.
103. Id. (“Congress didn’t say that a federal forum should await class certification or trial or some
mini-trial concerning likely success on the merits (something Congress certainly could have done if it
wished: consider the preliminary injunction context.)”).
104. Id. at 914 (citing Spivey, 528 F.3d at 986); see also supra note 100 and accompanying text.
105. See id.
106. See Dart Cherokee, 135 S. Ct. 547; see also Hammond, 844 F.3d 909.
107. See Dart Cherokee, 135 S. Ct. 547; see also supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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The Tenth Circuit misconstrued who retains the burden of proof when
determining the amount-in-controversy threshold for a class action.108 If the plaintiff
contests the notice of removal, Dart Cherokee’s second prong requires evidence that
the removal is valid.109 The proper evidentiary standard is the preponderance of the
evidence.110
Here, Hammond contested Stamps.com’s notice of removal when she filed
a motion to remand back to state court.111 As evidence, Stamps.com provided the
Corporate Controller’s statement regarding the number of cancellations in the past
four years.112 However, instead of requiring Stamps.com to show by a preponderance
of the evidence why the 312,680 cancellations satisfied the jurisdictional threshold,
the Tenth Circuit required Hammond to show it was legally impossible that the
amount-in-controversy was met.113 This was the incorrect standard to apply and is
not consistent with Dart Cherokee.
a.

The 10th Circuit required Hammond to prove the amount-incontroversy couldn’t be satisfied by a legal certainty, when actually
it is the defendant’s burden to satisfy this requirement by a
preponderance of the evidence.

This is problematic for two main reasons. First, Dart Cherokee does not
speak of the legal impossibility standard nor hold that it is the plaintiff’s burden to
thwart federal jurisdiction.114 The second prong of Dart Cherokee’s holding
specifically calls for the preponderance of the evidence standard to apply.115 As the
proponent of federal jurisdiction, the defendant must also come forward with such
evidence to satisfy the amount-in-controversy.116
By misconstruing who retains the burden of proof and the proper
evidentiary standard, the Tenth Circuit allowed Stamps.com to retain data about who
may be in the putative class. As the District Court noted, Stamps.com has sole access
to this data.117 At this point in litigation, Hammond has no idea who may be in the
injured class. The putative class may include enough members to satisfy the amountin-controversy or not – the evidence provided shows there is an equal chance of
either outcome and only Stamps.com could provide the answer. Hammond would
never be able prove that it is legally impossible that the amount-in-controversy
threshold is not satisfied if she cannot access this information.118 If the Hammond

108. See Dart Cherokee, 135 S. Ct. 547.
109. See id.
110. Id.
111. Supra note 70.
112. Supra note 76.
113. See Hammond, 844 F.3d 909.
114. See Dart Cherokee, 135 S. Ct. 547. It should also be noted that Hammond v. Stamps.com, 844
F.3d 909 (10th Cir. 2016) does not cite Dart Cherokee at any point in the opinion.
115. See 135 S. Ct. 547.
116. See id.; see also supra note 47 and accompanying text.
117. See Hammond, 2016 WL 8905293 at *8.
118. See Complaint at ¶ 46, Hammond v. Stamps.com, (2d Jud. Dist. N.M.) (D-101-CV-2015-01393)
(alleging that Stamps.com had sole access to this data and it would be accessed through the discovery
process).
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Court properly applied Dart Cherokee, then Stamps.com should have been
compelled to bring this information forward to show that the amount-in-controversy
is satisfied as it retains the burden of proof.
Second, the Tenth Circuit fails to confront that there is an equal probability
that either Hammond is the sole member of the putative class or that all 312,680
customers who canceled their memberships are members of the putative class. Equal
probability that the amount-in-controversy is either met or not fails to satisfy the
preponderance of the evidence standard. The problem with the Tenth Circuit’s
holding is not that it is more or less likely that a fact finder might legally conclude
the amount-in-controversy threshold is satisfied. The problem is that based on the
evidence showing all cancellations, a fact finder must legally conclude it is equally
likely the threshold limit is met or not.
b.

Various judicial policy reasons should have tipped the scale in favor
of upholding the district court’s decision.

The amount-in-controversy requirement has been justified as keeping small
claims out of federal court, while also not being too high as to keep federal court
unattainable.119 Despite CAFA creating an avenue for class actions into federal court,
there is a general presumption against granting federal jurisdiction.120 To balance
against this presumption,121 CAFA’s stated purpose is to apply to claims that are of
national importance.122 The Tenth Circuit made no inquiry into the possible national
ramifications of this class action.123 It simply could not make this inquiry if more
specialized data about the 312,680 cancellations was not available to the Court. This
general tradition of denying federal jurisdiction should have tipped the scale in favor
of granting a remand at this stage in litigation.
The Tenth Circuit expresses concern about courts becoming bogged down
with mini-trials over jurisdictional disputes.124 The Court reasons that the resources
spent on “mini-trials” are better spent on adjudicating the merits of the claim, as
opposed to deciding which forum the case proceeds in.125 Calling this requirement a
“mini-trial” is a mischaracterization. Stamps.com has already provided an affidavit
as to the total number of cancellations.126 Providing data in an affidavit that shows
the individuals that would be included in the putative class is not an extra step for
the Court to take, but for the Defendant. This would actually ensure that federal court
is the proper forum by giving better insight as to the amount-in-controversy. It would
be a greater waste of resources for this case to proceed in federal court only to

119. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 19, § 3701 Jurisdictional Amount – The Statutory Bases at 1.
120. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 5.3, at 249 (2d ed. 1994).
121. One can also view CAFA in a light that it failed to consider this general presumption. For
example, for district courts to decline jurisdiction either at their discretion or in mandatory situations, they
must make certain factual findings. This burden inherently increases the federal district court’s workload
for the mere possibility of declining jurisdiction. See infra note 130.
122. See S. REP. NO. 109-14 (2005).
123. See Hammond, 844 F.3d 909.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. Supra note 76.
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discover at a later time that Congress has deemed such a case not appropriate for the
federal forum.
CAFA contains certain provisions that give federal district courts discretion
to decline jurisdiction, and instances when they must decline jurisdiction.127
Allowing corporate defendants to withhold data concerning certain characteristics of
the putative class makes these provisions hollow. The putative class has a statutory
right to ensure that the case belongs in a federal forum. The decision in Hammond v.
Stamps.com took this right away from a putative class when it allowed a corporate
defendant to withhold data concerning similarly situated members and their
geographic locations.
II. The District Court should have allowed limited discovery to handle the
jurisdictional dispute in a way that is consistent with Dart Cherokee.
The Tenth Circuit notices that with 312,680 possible class members and
three hundred dollars per claim, there is a possibility of around $93 million incontroversy.128 While based on the Corporate Controller’s statement showing an
equal probability that Hammond is the sole member of the putative class, a possible
$93 million in-controversy easily skews one’s perception in favor of federal
jurisdiction. It is not difficult to conclude that with such a high possible amount-incontroversy, the $5,000,000 threshold is probably met. On its face, this is not
necessarily an unreasonable conclusion. The problem this case presents is an
evidentiary one.
a.

The Tenth Circuit should have remanded the case to the District
Court for limited discovery on the amount-in-controversy issue.

In Handforth v. Stenotype Inst. of Jacksonville, Inc., the district court
allowed limited discovery on whether CAFA jurisdiction was proper.129 The limited
discovery approach should be employed after the plaintiff has filed its motion to
remand back to state court. At that point, the plaintiff has challenged the notice of
removal, thereby triggering the defendant’s burden to produce evidentiary support
under Dart Cherokee’s second prong.130 Limited discovery should be narrowly
tailored to the specific issue between the parties to avoid as many potential disputes
as possible.

127. Supra notes 29, 30.
128. See Hammond, 844 F.3d 909.
129. No. 09-cv-361, 2010 WL 55578 (M.D. Fla. Jan 4, 2010); see also Dart Cherokee, 135 S. Ct. at
553–54 (citing the House Committee Judiciary Report on the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue
Clarification Act of 2011(“JVCA”) as guidance on the evidentiary issue. While the JVCA added 28 U.S.C
§ 1446(c)(2)(B), which provides requirements for removal in regular diversity cases, the analysis is
helpful in the class action context. The cited portion of the House Judiciary Committee Report on the
JVCA in Dart Cherokee includes, “[D]efendants do not need to prove to a legal certainty that the amount
in controversy requirement has been met. Rather, defendants may simply allege or assert that the
jurisdictional threshold has been met. Discovery may be taken with regard to that question. In case of a
dispute, the district court must make factual findings of jurisdictional fact to which the preponderance
standard applies.”) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
130. See Dart Cherokee, 135 S. Ct. 547.
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Here, the Tenth Circuit should have taken the opportunity in Hammond v.
Stamps.com to make limited discovery the normal procedure when dealing with
similar amount-in-controversy issues. The specific issue here was who should be
included in the putative class. Without knowing this information, Stamps.com was
able to inflate the possible amount-in-controversy. The limited discovery approach
is the most equitable solution for both parties and the Court while also remaining
loyal to Dart Cherokee’s holding. This is true for three main reasons.
First, the limited discovery approach allows the putative class to gain an
understanding of how many class members they may end up with. Simultaneously,
this allows the defendant to narrow the class to a certain characteristic that they will
eventually have to defend against. The unique aspect that inevitably arises in amountin-controversy disputes is that plaintiffs argue for a smaller possible reward while
defendants a larger possible liability.131 This unique aspect to amount-in-controversy
disputes would help keep both parties honest under the limited discovery approach.
The broader class characteristic yields a higher amount-in-controversy, while the
narrower class characteristic yields a smaller amount-in-controversy. Thus, the
plaintiff cannot maintain the class characteristic so broad as to gain more class
members at the expense of having to litigate in federal court. And the defendant also
cannot argue for a class characteristic so narrow as to minimize potential liability at
the expense of losing the federal forum.
Second, this approach allows the defendant to retain the burden of proof.132
Once the class characteristic has been sufficiently defined and both parties are aware
of the total number of class members, this evidence may be brought to the Court’s
attention. Now that the defendant has produced the data showing the number of
individuals potentially in the putative class, there is no longer a motive to retain this
information. As it is the defendant’s burden of proof, it will have to present the
calculation to the Court arguing the amount-in-controversy to be satisfied.
The general rules and procedure of discovery will help to guard against the
Tenth Circuit’s mini-trial concerns. As discovery takes its normal course, parties are
generally able to resolve disputes among themselves.133 Only when the parties cannot
reach common ground will a court become involved. In this type of amount-incontroversy dispute, the plaintiff would motion the court to compel the defendant to
produce the number of members in the putative class consistent with the defined
characteristic.134 This does not result in the plaintiff receiving an inequitable power
grab. The plaintiff, as the party motioning the court, would have to convince the court
that their class characterization is reasonable and they are entitled to this information.

131. See generally WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 19, § 3702.2 The Allocation of Burdens in Determining
the Amount-In-Controversy.
132. Supra note 47.
133. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (stating “[u]nless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of
discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant
to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of
the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant
information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether
the burden or expenses of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this
scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.”) (emphasis added).
134. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37.
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An unreasonable plaintiff runs the risk of losing their motion to compel, resulting in
the defendant retaining control over the putative class data.
Third, the limited discovery approach allows the CAFA provisions for a
district court to deny jurisdiction to come back into play.135 By delegating onto the
parties the burden of producing the characteristics of who may be in the putative
class, the court is now aware of the geographic location of these individuals. This
allows the Court to decide if this is a case of national importance, thus appropriate
for a federal forum, or if this case is of a local nature making state court
appropriate.136 For these types of amount-in-controversy disputes, this is also the
most efficient and effective approach. The court knows at an early point in the
litigation if the case is appropriate for federal court. Without this approach, the court
runs the risk of adjudicating a case from start to finish in federal court that yields less
than $5,000,000 in liability. Or, the court notices at a later time that the case is too
small and then relinquishes jurisdiction. Either way, there is a waste of judicial
resources and had the court obtained the putative class’s information at an earlier
time, it could have made an informed decision to retain jurisdiction or not.
In Hammond v. Stamps.com, the limited discovery approach would have
balanced the equities of everyone involved. Had the Tenth Circuit remanded to the
district court to engage in limited discovery, the parties would have had a better idea
of who would be a member of the putative class. The District Court had already
found that three hundred dollars were in-controversy per class member.137 Thus, the
only missing information to accurately determine the amount-in-controversy was the
size of the putative class. After the limited discovery, the District Court could have
found or denied jurisdiction based on the amount-in-controversy, or denied
jurisdiction based on CAFA’s geographic provisions.
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit had the opportunity to create a precedent going forward
that helps to handle these types of controversies. One cannot underestimate the
importance of which forum a case will be heard in. As the highly contested legislative
history of CAFA shows, federal subject matter jurisdiction can be crucial in a class
action context.138 Stamps.com was allowed to withhold data about who a putative
class includes, and then Hammond was required to prove to a legal certainty federal
subject matter jurisdiction did not exist. Not only does this ignore Dart Cherokee’s
instructions, but it is an almost impossible standard to defeat given the
circumstances. CAFA already provides relatively easy access to a federal forum.
Hammond v. Stamps.com made this even easier in the Tenth Circuit. Therefore,
allowing limited discovery is the most equitable solution for the parties, the most
effective and efficient approach for the court, and also maintains loyalty to Dart
Cherokee’s holding.

135.
136.
137.
138.

Supra notes 29, 30.
See S. REP. NO. 109-14 (2005).
Hammond, 2016 WL 8905293 at *6.
See generally S. REP. NO. 109-14 (2005).

